

Whether Simonides' line is the model for Lucian's, as I suspect, or merely offers a parallel that would have been widely known from the rhetorical handbooks, the similarity is suggestive and clearly significant for interpreting the sense of Tiresias' words and hence for the work as a whole. First, a thought usually taken as some anaemic form of Cynicism turns out to be hoary with age, antedating the movement by centuries, and preserved by the rhetoricians as a *χρέια*, a form conventionally used for the sayings of wise men (cf. Theon, *Rhet. Gr.* i 148 Walz). Lucian's technique here is highly characteristic. He gives Tiresias a line with archaic precedent but one suggesting a point of view comically unsuitable to the traditional representation of the Theban prophet in epic and tragic poetry.⁵ (Theon, for example, thinks Simonides is giving bad advice: βλαβερῶς παραινέϊ.) Most importantly, the advice is clearly neither 'nihilistic' nor 'conventionally Cynic' but as highly traditional as its setting in Hades and yet cleverly adapted to this particular thematic context. Menippus' tour of Hades has shown him that the varied roles men play on earth are as arbitrary, ephemeral and ultimately inconsequential as a theatrical spectacle (16). In Hades the powerful suffer indignities, while impoverished philosophers like Socrates and Diogenes converse and laugh (17–18). In short, what is taken most seriously on earth, wealth and power, is seen from Hades to be an illusion of perspective. Tiresias' advice—an oblique commendation of Lucian's own seriocomic stance⁶—reflects this ironic perspective on human endeavor,⁷ applies it to the philosophers' own exertions at metaphysical theory, and draws the appropriate

and παροιμίαι in Lucian (297–8, 405–434, 443–68; cf. 369 n. 2). Cf. also R. F. Hock and E. N. O'Neil, *The chreia in ancient rhetoric i: the 'progymnasmata'* (Atlanta, Ga. 1986) 336. For the first part of Tiresias' advice (τὸ παρὸν εὖ θέμενος), cf. Cratinus fr. 184, PCG iv 216.

⁵ It would be all the more characteristic of Lucian's method of drawing on ancient traditions if his Tiresias should give advice covertly recalling one of the most satirically-minded of the archaic poets, that is, if the line belongs to Semonides of Amorgos (almost universally spelled Simonides before Choeroboscus) rather than Simonides. Lucian refers approvingly to Semonides along with Hipponax at *Pseudol.* 2 while likening himself to Archilochus. The only other appearance in Lucian of either poet is a quotation from Simonides, *Pro Im.* 19. It is impossible to rule out either poet as the source of the *χρέια* on the basis of its content, especially since we do not know its original context; in any event, the lack of any discernible metrical pattern suggests that Theon's 'quotation' involves paraphrase.

⁶ Cf. R. B. Branham, *CA* iii 2 (1984) 143–63; *TAPA* cxv (1985) 237–43. I refer to the σπουδογέλοιος here not to 'explain' the passage by reference to another puzzle but to suggest that Tiresias' advice may in part be a Lucianic gloss on the idea of the seriocomic. Menippus is virtually the only author actually called σπουδογέλοιος in antiquity (Strabo xvi 2.29 Kramer ed.).

⁷ While the pairing of the serious with the comic or playful strikes a familiar note (cf. *Ar. Ran.* 389–93), the demotion of seriousness and advocacy of laughter or play is unusual in extant Greek literature. This emphasis differs, for example, from that of a famous passage in Plato (*Lg.* 803b) which endorses a serious attitude in spite of the game-like nature of life when viewed from the perspective of the gods (on παίζειν, see W. Burkert, *Eranos Jb* li [1982] 335–51). The closest parallel I know (other than Theon's *khreia*) occurs in a sympotic fragment celebrating σκώπτειν and γέλωτος against σπουδῆς as forming the ἀρετὴ of the occasion (*Iambi et Elegi Graeci*, ed. M. L. West, ii [Oxford 1972] *Adesp. Eleg. fr.* 27). It may be that part of the effect of Lucian's joke depends on making Tiresias the spokesman for a recognizably sympotic theme, thus violating our generic expectations for the grave wisdom the prophet would impart in Hades.

moral, one much like that which, in some context unfortunately lost to us, a classical poet had drawn some six centuries earlier: παραδράμης γελῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ περὶ μηδὲν ἐσπουδακῶς. The unexpected way in which elements of varied traditions are here combined—the Theban prophet covertly echoing the words of a lyric poet to a puzzled Cynic—is what makes the passage distinctively Lucianic.⁸

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Athenian Oligarchs: The Numbers Game

By the last quarter of the fifth century it was generally agreed that there were three basic forms of government: monarchy, democracy and oligarchy, and this basic division continued to the end of the classical period.¹ For the Athenians, this choice was for practical purposes reduced to one between democracy and oligarchy: kings might appear on the tragic stage, but in contemporary Athens sole rule was synonymous with tyranny, a form of government which had been beyond the pale since the expulsion of the Peisistratids. Indeed, in the late fifth century it was the object of a public hysteria which affords Aristophanes much scope for satire, particularly in Bdelycleon's speech in *Vesp.* 488 f., and in the offer of a reward ἦν τε τῶν τυράννων τίς τινα τῶν τεθνηκότων ἀποκτείνει (*Av.* 1074–5; cf. also *Lys.* 619, 630 f.).

Furthermore, from the late fifth century Athenian democrats tended to associate oligarchy with tyranny. Thucydides reports the allegation that the mutilation of the Herms was aimed ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ὀλιγαρχικῆ καὶ τυραννικῆ (vi 60.1 cf. 61.1); likewise after the restoration of democracy in 410 the decree of Demophantus (*And.* i 97) calls for an oath to resist both ἐάν τις ἄρξῃ τιν' ἀρχὴν καταλελυμένης τῆς δημοκρατίας and ἐάν τις τυραννεῖν ἐπαναστῆ ἢ τὸν τύραννον συγκαταστήσῃ.² Similarly in the early fourth century the orators refer to the Four Hundred and the Thirty as tyrants (*And.* i 75, *Isoc.* viii 123 cf. *X. HG* ii 4.1) or in the imagery of freedom and slavery traditionally attached to tyrants, which is already to be found in *And.* ii 27 (probably of 409/8) used of the Four Hundred.³ A memory of the

¹ First in Pi. *P.2.* 86–8, dated between 475 and 468; cf. *Hdt.* iii 80–2, *Pl. R.* 338d8, *Plt.* 291cd, 301c, *Isoc.* xii 132, *D.* xxiii 66 (n.b. τύραννος), *Aeschin.* i 4, *Arist. Pol.* 1279a25. The parallel degenerate forms do not appear until the early fourth century (*X. Mem.* iv 6.12, *Pl. Plt.* 291d–2a, *R.* 543 f.), perhaps inspired by the successive downfalls of the radical democracy and a close oligarchy at the end of the preceding century.

² N.B. the assimilation of ξυνωμοσία (implying oligarchy) to tyranny in *Ar. Vesp.* (345, 483, 488, 507 f. cf. 417). If *Thesmophoriazusaie* belongs to the Dionysia of 411 (for which see *HCT* v 187–93) the references to tyranny (338, 1143–4) on the eve of an oligarchic revolution are particularly striking.

³ Of the Thirty: *Lys.* ii 61–2, 64, xii 39, 73, 92, 94, 97, xiii 17, xiv 34, xviii 5, 24, 27, xxviii 13, xxxi 26, 31, 32, *Isoc.* xvi 37. Of the Four Hundred: *Lys.* xii 67. Of both revolutions: *Lys.* xii 78, *Isoc.* xx 10. For the usage cf. *Hell. Oxy.* 15.2. Oligarchs naturally tried to assimilate themselves to the constitutional forms of government: in *Thuc.* iii 62.3 the Thebans implicitly align themselves with democracy against δυναστεία, which is ἐγγυτάτω . . . τυράννου.

tyranny which was erratic in all but its bare outline, as Thucydides implies in his excursus on the tyrannicides (vi 54–9), fostered a climate of suspicion in which talk of the threat of tyranny could thrive. Alleged ancestral connections with the tyrants might be used in court (Antiphon *fr.* 1, *Lys.* xiv 39, *cf. Ar. Eq.* 447 f.), and those so accused might reply by reference to (fictional) support for ‘restoration of the demos’ on the model of 403 (And. i 106, ii 26; Isoc. xvi 25–7). By contrast, oligarchy as such received little attention, and it is unusual when Thucydides speaks of the crew of the *Paralus* as αἰεὶ δῆποτε ὀλιγαρχία καὶ μὴ παρουσία ἐπικειμένουσιν (viii 73.5).⁴

At Athens, democracy meant radical democracy: Alcibiades might claim to an audience of Spartan oligarchs that anything opposed to τῷ δυναστεύοντι deserved the name of democracy (δῆμος, the radical title; Thuc. vi 89.4) but Athenians would have agreed with Athenagoras (vi 39.1) when he says that δῆμος is the name of the whole, oligarchy of a part. The Athenian demos unreflectingly opposed anything less than full democracy (i.e. the status quo) under the most extreme slogan, tyranny,⁵ and it was symptomatic of this attitude that the mutilation of the Herms and the parodying of the Mysteries were lumped together into a single great tyrannical conspiracy. It is a tempting hypothesis that this binary view, of a choice between democracy and tyranny, laid the Athenians open to the oligarchic coup of 411, since many democrats had never seriously considered what real oligarchy and oligarchs might be like.⁶ Thus when the oligarchy was presented as an alternative form of democracy,⁷ many of them may have believed it, perhaps helped by an already existing desire to shed responsibility which is attested by the appointment of the probouloi (Thuc. viii 1.3).

On the other side, oligarchic thinking seems to have been equally constrained by an over-rigid ideology. Forrest has suggested that oligarchs believed that there were essential preconditions for democracy, chiefly naval strength and income from the empire, and argues plausibly that the oligarchs were misled by this doctrinaire view, which saw what were attendant phenomena as the basis of the democracy, into thinking that the Athenian democracy could not be removed,

⁴ The failure of right-wing sources such as ps.-X. and Andocides to mention oligarchy as such is not surprising, but it is noteworthy that ὀλιγαρχία and its cognates do not appear in Aristophanes.

⁵ The author of [And.] iv remarks that the Athenians think a lot about the word ‘tyrant’ while ignoring the thing itself (iv 27). As an index of the shift of political debate to a constitutional level one might note that ὀλιγαρχία and its cognates are found 5 times in Hdt., 26 times in Thuc., and δημοκρατία and cognates 3 times in Hdt. and 22 times in Thuc.

⁶ Conspiracy might be equated with tyranny (above n. 2), but it might equally be left undefined, as part of the standard vocabulary of political abuse (e.g. *Ar. Eq.* 236, 257, 452, 476, 628, 862, *Vesp.* 953). If anything, ξυνομοίται were associated with manipulation of the democratic system (*Ar. Lys.* 577–8, Thuc. viii 54.4) and it was perhaps not appreciated that they might alter their objectives. The vagueness of the expression κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου also helped, focussing as it did on the victim, not the aggressor: in Thuc. vi 27.3, for example, ξυνομοίται implies oligarchy, but the focus on Alcibiades suggests tyranny (vi 28.2 *cf.* 15.4; Seager *Historia* xvi [1967] 6–18).

⁷ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δημοκρατούμενοι (Thuc. viii 53.1). There are hints of a similar process at Megara in 424 (Thuc. iv 74) inasmuch as the future oligarchs got themselves elected under a democratic system, though the element of military force also suggests resemblances to the techniques of the Thirty (n.b. *HCT ad loc.*).

until 413/2, when the disappearance of the same phenomena caused them to believe that it was as good as over, and so stage their coup.⁸

Despite the existence of such radical positions,⁹ ideological labels turn out in practice to have been rather imprecise, and the same constitution might be described as both oligarchy and democracy. To the diehard members of the Four Hundred, participation by the Five Thousand would have been ἀντικρυς δῆμον (Thuc. viii 92.11), yet the property qualification would have made it an oligarchy for a radical democrat.¹⁰ Likewise the speaker of [Herodes] περί πολιτείας¹¹ says of Sparta τοιαύτην γε [sc. ὀλιγαρχίαν καθιστάσι] οἷαν ἡμεῖς εὐχόμενοι πολὺν χρόνον καὶ ποθοῦντες, ὀλίγον χρόνον ἰδόντες, ἀφηρέθεμεν (30), which has been taken to be a reference to the short-lived hoplite franchise of Larissa. This Thessalian constitution is termed a democracy by Theramenes (X. *HG* ii 3.36), though since this is in the context of his trial before the boule, he may be attempting to discredit Critias, who had been involved in trying to establish it, by implying that he has democratic leanings.¹² As we have seen, democracy could be defined inclusively (the name of the whole) or exclusively (anything opposed to tyranny), and oligarchy could be presented as democracy; furthermore, a group might change from regarding itself as democratic to constituting itself as an oligarchy: οἱ γὰρ τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες μεταβαλλόμενοι αὐθις καὶ πεισθέντες ὑπὸ τε τοῦ Πεισάνδρου, ὅτε ἦλθε, καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ξυνομοτῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγένοντο τε ἐξ τριακοσίουσιν ξυνομοίται καὶ ἐμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς δήμῳ ὄντι ἐπιθήσεσθαι (Thuc. viii 73.2).¹³

⁸ *YCS* xxiv (1975) 37 f. For naval strength and the empire see [X.] *Ath.* 1.2, 19–20, 2.2–6; 1.15–7. There are references to the sea, democratic interference and the link between the demos and πονηρία in *PHeid.* 182, which may be of similar date (*fr.* a3, b2–3, a5; for a text and full discussion see Gigante *Maia* ix [1957] 68 f.). It is uncertain whether this papyrus is part of a political treatise or a fragment of comedy (it is *fr.* 362 dub. in C. Austin *Comicorum graecorum fragmenta in papyris reperta* [Berlin 1973]).

⁹ For an extreme statement, see the ‘moderate’ views of Theramenes (X. *HG* ii 3.48).

¹⁰ Although the archon for 411 was retained in office, in other ways the restored democracy made a clean break with the past (Rhodes *JHS* xcii [1972] 126; τούτους in *Ath. Pol.* 34.1 refers to the government of the Five Thousand, who are thus distinguished from the restored democracy, ὁ δῆμος). Rhodes brings out well the relativity of slogans in this case (*ibid.* 122–3, 125), regardless of the technical definition of the government of the Five Thousand, which continues to be debated.

¹¹ The authorship of this speech is attributed to Critias by Wade-Gery (*CQ* xxxix [1945] 19 f. = *Essays in Greek history* 271 f.), who argues that the political sentiments are his, though he will not have been the speaker. For the association below of Theramenes’ comments with the Larissaeian constitution see 24–6. Debate continues about the date and attribution of this speech, but I find Wade-Gery’s arguments persuasive.

¹² The fact that the government of the Five Thousand (and, nominally, of the Four Hundred) also contained elements of a hoplite franchise (below, 162–3) shows how vague, emotional and open to misrepresentation constitutional labels were.

¹³ Sparta’s constitution caused a different kind of confusion. In the fifth century historians contented themselves with references to its excellence and enduring stability (Hdt. i 65.2, Thuc. i 18.1), but her victory in the Peloponnesian War made her a natural model for imitation (X. *Mem.* iii 5.14 f.) and stimulated investigation into the basis of her success, thus throwing into prominence her puzzling constitution (Pl. *Lg.* 712de), which might be variously described as

Political slogans suffered from the same lack of precision: *ἰσονομία*, the watchword of democracy in Herodotus (e.g. iii 80.8, 83.1) can, by the late fifth century, be used to describe constitutional oligarchy, as opposed to *δυναστεία* (Thuc. iii 62.3, iv 78.3). Other *ἰσο-* compounds with political significance occur in Thucydides only in iii 82.8 (a damning context) and in vi 38.5 and 39, where Athenagoras¹⁴ gives the most doctrinaire account of democracy in the work; elsewhere the term generally used for democracy is *δημος*, with its stress on the people's sovereignty.¹⁵

It is not surprising that in the late fifth century some Athenians should have responded to this tendency to define constitutions in subjective and emotional terms by trying to fix more objective limits. Limitation to a single family or group of families or by birth generally was by now scarcely practical at Athens, even had the claims of noble birth not been under attack from sophistic thought. Age was a possible limiting factor,¹⁶ but though the selection of the *probouloi* from *πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν* (Thuc. viii 1.3) was conservative, the age limits imposed in 411 were uncontroversial, simply echoing democratic practice.¹⁷ A property qualification, a requirement frequently found elsewhere,¹⁸ was easy enough to establish on its own, though, as we shall see, it created problems when combined with the most favoured solution, definition by fixed number.

While numerical limits and systems had long been applied to parts of Athens' administrative machinery, notably the *boule*, their application to the citizen body as a whole was unprecedented, and while the numerical arrangements of the Cleisthenic and Solonian councils reflect attempts at equal representation (50 and 100 per tribe respectively), in the late fifth century there seems to be a new arbitrariness and an interest in numerical patterns for their own sake, for example in the proposed monarchy (X. *Lac.* 15), oligarchy (D. xx 108) or, more tendentiously, democracy (Isoc. vii 60–1, xii 178: n.b. A. Andrewes *Ancient society and institutions, studies V. Ehrenberg* [Oxford 1966] 14–7), a problem finally resolved by the concept of the mixed constitution (e.g. Arist. *Pol.* 1265b33 f., 1270b7 f., 1293b1 f., 1294b13 f. cf. *Plb.* vi 3.8, 10.6–12).

¹⁴ In the context the name seems significant: many of Athenagoras' attitudes and preoccupations are those of contemporary Athenian democrats (see *HCT* iv 301 for echoes of Cleon). For another possible case n.b. Euphemus at vi 75.4; both names are, of course, well attested elsewhere and it is the context which makes them significant, particularly since the individuals are otherwise unknown.

¹⁵ For the continuing importance of equality in doctrinaire democratic ideology cf. E. *Supp.* 353, 408, 432, 434, 441; it is reflected also in the group of significant *ἰσο-* names in the late fifth and early fourth century: *Ἰσαρχος* PA no. 7685, *Ἰσόδημος* PA 7710–1, *Ἰσοδίκη* PA 7712, *Ἰσόνομος* PA 7719–20, *Ἰσοτιμίδης* PA 7721 (cf. *Ἀριστοκράτης* PA 1892–6).

¹⁶ For age as a characteristic, at least de facto, of participation in oligarchies, n.b. L. Whibley *Greek oligarchies: their character and organisation* (London 1896) 148–9; Cary *JHS* xlviii (1928) 229 and n. 50.

¹⁷ *Ath. Pol.* 29.2, 30.2, 31.1 with Rhodes *A commentary on the Aristotelian Athenian Politeia* (Oxford 1981) *ad loc.* If age limits were imposed on the Three Thousand, they have left no trace in the sources, but hand-picking of reliable individuals probably obviated the need for other types of limitation.

¹⁸ Whibley (n. 16) 126–32. Even this criterion was not absolutely reliable: Phormisius, as one of the returning exiles, presumably saw his proposal to limit the franchise as moderate democracy (D. H. *Lys.* 32), though to Lysias (xxxiv) it is a proposal to subvert the constitution and a prelude to oligarchy.

four councils of *Ath. Pol.* 30.3,¹⁹ and in the selection of the Four Hundred by a playground system of 'picking up sides.'²⁰

Athens' unusually high population was no doubt one reason why the upper limits chosen for the citizen body, 5,000 in 411 and 3,000 in 404–3, were substantially higher than usual in oligarchies of fixed number, where 1,000 was the norm and lower figures not uncommon.²¹ One advantage of such large figures was that they justified the retention of a much smaller group functioning as a *boule* or *gerousia* and so retaining effective control of affairs, as happened in both Athenian oligarchic revolutions,²² though in 403 even the pretence of political participation by the wider citizen body was abandoned. There are, however, indications that this was not the only consideration which influenced the numerical limit set in each case.

One of the major themes in the ancient accounts of the events of 411 is that of hoplite participation: oligarchic propaganda lays heavy stress on the *ἄπλα παρέχόμενοι* (Thuc. viii 65.3, *Ath. Pol.* 29.5),²³ and the ideal of a hoplite franchise was perpetuated in the government of the Five Thousand (Thuc. viii 97.1 with *HCT ad loc.*; *Ath. Pol.* 33.1). This concept was always somewhat vaguely expressed, never more so than in the expression *εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν* [*sc.* τῶν πεντακισχιλίων] *ὅποσοι καὶ ἄπλα παρέχονται* (Thuc. viii 97.1). Although not exactly equivalent to a property qualification (despite Socrates' reputation for poverty, he fought as a hoplite at Potidaea and Delium), it will in practice have had roughly the same effect as one²⁴ and so have been in line with oligarchic orthodoxy, and it would appear that the massed hoplites did in fact function as a 'revolutionary assembly' at one point in 411.²⁵ The difficulty lay in reconciling a hoplite franchise with a

¹⁹ This system reflects the similarly elaborate constitution of contemporary oligarchic Boeotia (*Hell. Oxy.* 16.2–4, Thuc. v 38.2), which may have been its model. In both the constitutions of *Ath. Pol.* 30–1 the prevalent numerical specificity and procedural elaboration are presumably largely for propaganda purposes.

²⁰ Thuc. viii 67.3; this was presumably the simplest and safest way of expanding from an inner group to the magic figure of 400, but finds a curious echo in Xenophon's account of the elder Cyrus' selection of his Persian expeditionary force (*Cyr.* i 5.5). Plato's interest in numerical systems probably owes more to Pythagoreanism (*Lg.* 737–8), but n.b. Whibley (n. 16) 136 n. 17.

²¹ Whibley (n. 16) 134–6.

²² N.B. Whibley (n. 16) 157–61. Oligarchic councils were commonly appointed for life, but the suggestion that the Four Hundred be selected from the Five Thousand in rotation (Thuc. viii 93.2) resembles the Boeotian system (above n. 19), its closeness to democratic practice making it a suitable concession in a crisis. Under the Thirty there was both a *boule*, for a veneer of legality, and a *gerousia* in the Thirty themselves.

²³ See Rhodes 1981 (n. 17) *ad loc.* for *δυνατός* as an oligarchic slogan, and cf. the remark in [Herodes] 31: *ὄρω δὲ μήθ' ἄπλα μὴδ' ἄλλη δύναμις ἔστι τὰ κοινὰ πράσσειν, οὐχ ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἀπεσπέρηθη τῶν πραγμάτων.*

²⁴ N.B. the suggestion of Cary (n. 16) 225 that the constitution of the Ten Thousand at Cyrene, which was based on a single property qualification, was equivalent to a hoplite franchise. Plato's *Laws* also presents a hoplite franchise (753bc), though the light-armed get a say in military elections (755e).

²⁵ Thuc. viii 93.1. The possible identification of the assembly at Colonus with the Five Thousand needs treating with scepticism in view of the composition of that assembly, and is in any case problematic (n.b. Rhodes 1981 [n. 17] *ad loc.*, also *HCT* v 203f. on *Lys.* xx). On the leading role of the hoplites in the formation of the government of the Five Thousand n.b. *HCT* v 326.

numerical limit as low as 5,000: whatever the total of Athenian hoplites, it was well above that, and Polystratus' 9,000 was at least a plausible guess (Lys. xx 13).²⁶ Hence the division in the sources as to whether 5,000 was the upper (Thucydides) or lower (*Athenaion Politeia*) limit of the franchise: the propaganda line varied according to whether the audience regarded the numerical limit or the hoplite question as the more important. 'Five thousand' was a figure plucked out of the air, acceptable to oligarchs while capable of being sold to moderate or disenfranchised democrats.²⁷

The individual most closely associated with the hoplite franchise is Theramenes. It was he who was chiefly responsible for the establishment of the government of the Five Thousand, so it is not surprising that the *Athenaion Politeia*, which consistently treats him favourably, follows the proponents of the hoplite franchise in treating 5,000 as a minimum. In 403 we find Theramenes taking Critias to task for believing that a limit of 3,000 can include all good men and exclude all bad (X. *HG* ii 3.19 cf. *Ath. Pol.* 36) and, condemning extremes of oligarchy and democracy alike, reiterating the claims of a hoplite franchise: τὸ μέντοι σὺν τοῖς δυναμένοις καὶ μεθ' ἵππων καὶ μετ' ἀσπίδων ὠφελεῖν διὰ τούτων τὴν πολιτείαν πρόσθεν ἄριστον ἡγούμην εἶναι καὶ νῦν οὐ μεταβάλλομαι (X. *HG* ii 3.48).²⁸ His condemnation of the Thirty for making their government both oppressive and inferior in numbers to its subjects suggests that he may have believed that even an oligarchy should be a majority.

Critias and his supporters are thus associated with the decision to limit the franchise to 3,000. An ideological commitment to the limitation of the franchise to a small number probably played a part: the author of [Herodes] *περὶ πολιτείας*, who may well be Critias (above, n. 11) wonders whether political participation by two thirds of the citizen body can count as oligarchy (30). More strikingly, the funeral monument set up for Critias and the other members of the oligarchy who died in the first battle with the returning democrats in 403 bore a figure of Oligarchia setting fire to Democratia (DK 88 A13), this at a time when the Thirty could perfectly well have put up a figure of Aristocrata had they so wished (n.b. Thuc. iii 82.8). The numerical criterion was at least a reliable way for oligarchs to define themselves.

Various explanations may be advanced for the choice of 3,000 as the upper limit to the franchise. First, it was significantly lower than 5,000, a number which had proved unacceptable in an oligarchy (indeed, had probably always been so to the more doctrinaire), and

presumably it accorded with the Thirty's estimate of the level of reliable support on which they could depend. It was also half of 6,000, the number of jurors at Athens and the quorum required for certain decisions in the assembly, and hence perhaps a figure symbolic of political participation at Athens,²⁹ and it was a tenth of Athens' notional population of 30,000.³⁰ More significantly, it was a reasonable estimate of the total of Spartan homoioi at the time,³¹ and the idea that such a connection may have lain behind the choice of 3,000 is encouraged both by the association of the measure with the notorious laconiser Critias (e.g. X. *HG* ii 3.34, DK 88 B6-9, 32-7) and by certain other measures of the Thirty which have Spartan overtones.³² Whatever the precise blend of reasons for the choice, it was almost entirely ideologically motivated; since Athens was to be a satellite of Sparta, there was no need to maintain or conciliate a large army.³³

Critias and his associates had learnt from the débâcle of 411: they relied on a single criterion of definition for oligarchy, numerical limit, and they pitched that limit low enough to be unquestionably oligarchic. It is hardly surprising that fixed number did not enjoy a long career as a rallying-cry at Athens:³⁴ it was very vulnerable to charges of arbitrariness, and the only reply the Thirty could find to Theramenes was to kill him, an expedient which would not bear much repetition. Ironically, the Thirty did succeed in establishing the symbolic value of one number: the *Athenaion Politeia* (53.1) reports that after their rule the number of κατὰ δῆμους δικασταὶ was changed from thirty to forty, no doubt because the

²⁹ E.g. Ar. *Vesp.* 662, *Ath. Pol.* 24.3; Plu. *Arist.* 7, And. i. 87, D. xxiv 45-6, lix 89. For this sort of measure of political activity cf. Thuc. viii 72.1. Of course, it is a fallacy to identify the peak count with the total number of individuals involved.

³⁰ Hdt. v 97.2; for the figure see Gallo *Pisa, Scuole Normale Superiori, Annali* ix² (1979) 505 f., Meiggs *CR* n.s. xiv (1964) 2-3.

³¹ For the Spartiate population in the late fifth century see W. G. Forrest *A history of Sparta* (London 1968) 132-5, G. E. M. De Ste. Croix *The origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London 1972) 331-2, Andrewes (n. 13) 7. However, an exact correspondence to historical reality is less important than the point that this would be a reasonable estimate for a laconising Athenian to make, since Sparta's recent success made her contemporary form, rather than any Spartan ideal figure, the model for imitation (above, n. 13). The particular round figure might then be influenced by the importance of the number 3 in Sparta's constitutional arrangements: there were 3 tribes and 30 members of the gerousia, including the kings, and Plutarch's figures for the Lycurgan distribution of land are also all divisible by 3, including the total of 9000 Spartiates (*Lyc.* 8); n.b. Forrest *op. cit.* 42-6.

³² This theory is developed in detail by Whitehead *AncSoc* xiii/xiv (1982/1983) 105-30 and P. Krentz *The Thirty at Athens* (Ithaca N.Y. 1982) 64-8. Among other measures, they note the ephors who preceded the Thirty (Lys. xii 43-4), the 300 lash-bearers (*Ath. Pol.* 35.1 cf. X. *Lac.* 4.3, *HG* iii 3.9), the reduction to perioecic status of those not included in the Three Thousand, and the overtones of *ἔσηλασία* in the attacks on Metics.

³³ Though it may be worth observing that a third of the population of 10,000 in the ideal city of Hippodamas of Miletus were to be soldiers (*Arist. Pol.* 1267b30-3).

³⁴ The dispute over the membership of the boule in 411 was conducted in terms of numbers (Thuc. viii 86.6), but this concealed a wider issue: 400 represented a return to alleged Solonian practice (*Ath. Pol.* 31.1 with Rhodes 1981 (n. 17) *ad loc.*, *HCT* v 227) while 500, the Cleisthenic figure, represented democratic practice, despite earlier attempts to steal the democrats' clothes (*Ath. Pol.* 29.3 with Rhodes *op. cit.*; *HCT* v 215; A. Fuks *The ancestral constitution* [London 1953] ch. 1).

²⁶ See *HCT* v 329 for a brief discussion of the numbers question.

²⁷ The very gap between the theoretical figure and Polystratus' demonstrates its artificiality, perhaps arrived at by multiplying the boule by ten; the tribal organisation would have suited ideas of a hoplite franchise. A certain degree of fudging in the early stages is also suggested by Pesiander's ἐς ὀλίγους μάλλον (Thuc. viii 53.3); μάλλον looks like a cautious afterthought.

²⁸ That there was some debate about the effectiveness of numerical limits is also suggested by an intriguing fragment of an early fourth century dialogue in the Socratic manner, in which it is argued that the number of participants can no more be used to differentiate between constitutions than it can be used to define flute-playing. The text is edited by Merkelbach in *Aegyptus* xxix (1949) 56-8; his deletion of δημοκρατία and ὀλιγαρχία in the last sentence seems essential to make sense of the passage.

associations of the former number were too painful. It seems in every way a fitting monument.³⁵

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³⁵ I would like to thank Peter Derow, George Forrest, Steve Tracy and the *J.H.S.* editor and referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this note.

The Francis-Vickers Chronology

Over the last few years the late E. D. Francis and M. Vickers (after this referred to as F. and V.) have been promulgating a revised chronology for Greek art from its later Geometric to its Early Classical phases. The subject is large and they have dealt with it in instalments, scattered over various journals. In *Table I* I give a list, though it may not be complete.

TABLE I

- I 'Leagros kalos', *PCPs* ccvii (1981) 97-136. FV.
- II 'Kaloi, ostraka and the wells of Athens', *AJA* lxxxvi (1982) 264. FV.
- III Burlington Mag. cxxiv (1982) 41-2 (review of B. S. Ridgway, Archaic style in Greek sculpture). FV.
- IV 'Signa priscae artis: Eretria and Siphnos', *JHS* ciii (1983) 49-67. FV.
- V 'Green goddess: gifts to Lindos from Amasis of Egypt', *AJA* lxxxviii (1984) 68-9. FV.
- VI 'Amasis and Lindos', *BICS* xxxi (1984) 119-30. FV.
- VII 'Hallstatt and Early La Tène chronology in C., S. and E. Europe', *Antiquity* lviii (1984) 208-11. V.
- VIII *JHS* civ (1984) 267-8 (review of F. Brommer, *The-sens*). FV.
- IX 'Persepolis, Vitruvius and the Erechtheum Caryatids', *RA* 1985, 3-28. V.
- X 'Greek Geometric pottery at Hama', *Levant* xvii (1985) 131-8. FV.
- XI 'Early Greek coinage, a reassessment', *NC* cxlv (1985) 1-44. V.
- XII *CR* c (1986) 285-6 (review of P. C. Bols, *Antike Bronzetechnik*). V.
- XIII *JACT Review* v (1986) 36-7 (review of J. Boardman, *Greek sculpture: the Classical period and The Parthenon and its sculpture*). V.
- XIV 'Persépolis, Athènes et Sybaris: questions de monnayage et de chronologie', *REG* xcix (1986) 239-70. (A rehash of XI). V.
- XV 'Dates, methods and icons' (in ed. C. Bérard, *Actes du Colloque: images et sociétés en Grèce ancienne* Lausanne [1987] 19-25). V.

Announced (the references to publication not always accurate)

- 'This other Herakles' (I, 125 n. 3).
- 'Oenoe, or, a tomb with a view' (I, 125 n. 16).
- 'New wine from Old Smyrna; Early Corinthian pottery and the Greeks' eastern neighbours'; (I, 125 n. 16; VI, 129 n. 44; XI, 19 n. 149). FV.
- 'The Agora revisited' (XI, 28 n. 222). FV.
- 'Heracles Lacedaemonius' (XI, 14 n. 105). V.
- E. D. Francis, *Reflections of Persia in Greek art and literature* (Waynflete lectures, 1983). (XI, 1 n. 2). F.
- 'Attic symposia after the Persian wars' (in ed. O. Murray, *Symptica*). (XI, 1 n. 2). V.
- 'The role of Darius the Great in the construction of the Artemisium at Ephesus' (in ed. M. J. Price, *Proc. of the British Museum Colloquium 'The Archaic temple of Artemis at Ephesus'*). (IX, 8 n. 34). V.

(F=Francis; V=Vickers; FV=Francis and Vickers.

For brevity I cite the published papers by the Roman numeral I have prefixed)

What F. and V. are attempting is roughly this. They accept the relative chronology based on stylistic sequences and on contexts, but they reject the absolute dates to which it has generally been attached, arguing that the fixed points—the connections with precisely dated events—have been misinterpreted or missed. In effect this means that dates from the eighth to the later sixth century according to the accepted system are to be lowered by some sixty years, after that there is a continuing convergence, and finally about the middle of the fifth century the old and the new scales agree.¹

To begin with the earliest fixed points. Greek Geometric pottery has been found at several sites in Syria and Palestine, some of it in promising contexts.² For Tell Abu Hawam and Megiddo the dating of the strata is disputed, so that for the present it is prudent to put them aside. It is, though, agreed that Hama was destroyed in 720 BC, and here three unstratified Late Geometric sherds are the problem. If, as the excavators thought,³ Hama was not reoccupied till the Hellenistic period, these sherds should not be later than 720 BC. That is unacceptable to F. and V., who cite evidence for some reoccupation and, though it seems to have been very limited, they argue that the three sherds could be later than 720 BC, the debris of settlement or—an ingenious resort—of some 'passing caravan'. Though statistically less probable than the orthodox opinion, that of F. and V. is possible. There is also the late Middle Geometric II sherd from stratum V at Samaria, which is usually thought to go down no later than to 750 BC: here F. and V. seem to conflate strata V and VI, so getting a terminal date of 722 BC,⁴ when Sargon sacked the city, and further—to give themselves more play—they doubt the sherd's position in the Geometric sequence.

Another tantalising context comes from Grave 325 (formerly 102) on Pithecusae.⁵ Here a blue paste scarab with the cartouche of the Egyptian king Bocchoris and said to be of Egyptian manufacture was found with three Early Protocorinthian pots, the latest of which—according to the accepted chronology—should not be later than 700 BC. Bocchoris died in or just before 712 BC after a short and disastrous reign, so that he is not likely to have been commemorated posthumously; the scarab is a poor thing, which in Pithecusae, where Eastern imports were fairly common, would be surprising as an heirloom; and the marks of wear are natural enough, if it belonged to the child in whose grave it was put. For these reasons it is generally supposed that the Bocchoris scarab was buried within a few years of its manufacture, so supporting the current dates for Early Protocorin-

¹ This is stated more explicitly in XV, 22, which I saw after this paper was written. Here conventional 575-50 becomes c. 490, conventional 550-25 becomes c. 480, conventional 525-500 becomes c. 475, and conventional 500-475 becomes c. 465 (all BC), so compressing 100 conventional years into 25 or not much more. I have not considered the probability of so rapid an artistic development and increase in production.

² The best discussion is by J. N. Coldstream in *Greek Geometric pottery* (London 1968) 302-313: it should be noted that one or perhaps both of the sherds from Megiddo have since been assigned to stratum IV and not V (P. J. Riis, *Sukas* i [Copenhagen 1973] 144-6; cf. Coldstream, *AJA* lxxix [1975] 155). For F. and V.'s criticisms see X, 131-6.

³ E. Fugmann, *Hama* ii 1 (Copenhagen 1958) 269; G. Ploug, *ib.* iii 1 (1985) 13.

⁴ Still in a letter K. M. Kenyon, without further explanation, dated the end of stratum V c. 750-20 BC (P. J. Riis [n. 1] 146-8).

⁵ Coldstream (n. 1) 316-7.